Congress composition and electoral advantage by Angulo Santacruz, Juan
Congress Composition and Electoral Advantage
Juan Carlos Angulo Santacruz∗
Universidad del Rosario
Department of Economics
Thesis advisor:
Juan Fernando Vargas
November 25, 2015
Abstract
In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I
simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which
senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been
made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the
senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were
near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance
to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior.
I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during
the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the
differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine
if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral
result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of
votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally,
I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no
differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or
legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral
advantage.
Key words: Colombia, Senate, political reform, senators, Hare quota, regression discontinuity,
legislative behavior.
∗I am especially grateful to Juan Fernando Vargas (my advisor) for his excellent supervision, his feedback, comments,
and suggestions (the title one of them). I thank Jorge Gallego and Mo´nica Pacho´n for their valuable comments and
suggestions. I also would like to thank C¸ag˘atay Kayi and Ana Mar´ıa Trib´ın for reading preliminary version of this paper
and their comments that helped improved this thesis. I am grateful to Daniel Mart´ınez and Sergio Montoya with whom
this idea begins to take shape and for letting me work it. Finally, to Darwin Corte´s, Horacio Coral, Carlos Salamanca,
Jose´ Guerra, Dario Salcedo, Rafael Ch Dura´n, Carmen Delgado, and Paola Poveda for their comments. All errors remain
my own. E-mail: angulos.juan@urosario.edu.co
1
1 Introduction
In 1991 a new Constitution brought different changes in the Colombian political arena. It favors
political competition by lowering entry barriers that restricted political participation. This allowed
not only the traditional political parties (Conservative and Liberal) but any new party or movement
to run in any election. As a consequence, new political parties began to take place in the Congress,
the Departmental Assembly, and the Municipal Council.
Particularly in the Congress, one of the changes was introducing the national electoral district in
the Senate in order to allow the new candidates and movements, who were not strong enough at the
regional level, to present a national candidacy and to get votes from different regions and a broader
electorate so as to they could been elected (Roland and Zapata, 2005, and Rodr´ıguez-Raga, 2001).
A consequence of lowering entry barriers was the proliferation of small parties in the Senate as
well as fractionalized lists from bigger parties (Hoskin et al., 2011). Due to this proliferation, among
other reasons, a political reform was held in 2003 (Battle and Puyana, 2013). The reform limited
the number of lists and candidates that each party could present to only one list with at most the
same number of candidates as public offices to be provided. At the same time, it changed the seats’
assignment mechanism to the Senate adopting D’Hondt method. Under this mechanism, seats are
assigned proportionally to party lists; therefore, a candidate who did not get as many votes as other
candidate could get a seat if his party has enough votes.
These changes generate a unique scenario to evaluate its effects as the number of public offices to
be provided is not modified while the assignment mechanism is (Pacho´n and Shugart, 2010). Then,
I can simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the actual results but the assignment mechanism used
previous to the reform, namely Hare quota and largest remainders system. Under this mechanism,
if there are M public offices to be provided, the seats go to the first M candidates ordered from the
highest voting to the lowest voting. Hence, the seats go to the candidates who obtained more votes,
regardless of their party (Pacho´n and Shugart, 2010). Therefore, the senators that would have not
been elected in the simulation are the ones who did not obtained the minimum number of votes needed
to get a seat had the Hare quota been maintained.
The purpose of this study is to compare the legislative behavior between the senators that would
have been elected with respect to the ones that would have lost the election in the simulation. As the
senators that would have not been elected, had the reform not been made, are the ones who obtained
fewer votes among all the elected senators. Then, I would expect that this group of senators will make
an effort to try to improve their vote share in the subsequent election, with respect to the senators
that would have been elected anyways.
To test this hypothesis, I use a sharp regression discontinuity design where the senators that would
have not got a seat using Hare quota assignment mechanism are the treatment group, and those who
would have got a seat anyways are the control group. The identifying assumption is that the two types
of senators are comparable. This is likely the case if both get a similar share of votes. Therefore, I
test for differences in the legislative behavior between the senators of these two groups who are near
the minimum share of votes needed to get a seat in the simulation.
When comparing the legislative behavior in the 4-year term of the senators near the threshold,
using as proxy of legislative behavior the amount of law drafts presented, a discipline index, and the
attendance to voting sessions, I find that the senators that would have not been elected had the reform
not been made present a differential behavior with respect to the ones that would have been elected
anyways. In particular, the treated senators present more law drafts, are more disciplined, and attend
to more voting sessions.
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Since there is a differece in behavior between the groups of senators cannot be interpreted as mak-
ing better (worse) senators or politicians, then it can be due to senators looking for an electoral return
in the subsequent (2010) Senate election. Therefore, I check the differences in the electoral returns
and I find no difference in the probability of being elected. Additionally, I find no difference in the
share of votes they obtained in 2010 election, in their share of votes within their party list, and in
the concentration of their voting. Also, I check the probability of the senators running in 2010 Senate
election being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find that neither group is more
likely of being investigated.
Overall, my results suggest that the group of senators that would have not been elected had the
reform not been made have a different legislative behavior with respect to the group of senators that
would have been elected anyways. Particularly, the senators that would have not been elected present
more law drafts, are 20% more disciplined, and attend to at least 4% more voting sessions when com-
pared to the groups of senators that would have been elected anyways. However, when I check the
electoral returns in the subsequent election, I find no effect of the differential behavior in the electoral
returns. Thus, the legislative behavior of the senators during the 4-year term seems not to be related
with their results in the subsequent election.
2 Background: Colombian political system
The 1991 Constitution reformed the electoral process. One of the objectives was to allow any groups
of citizens to take part in the elections. In order to do this, entry barriers to political competition
were lowered, allowing the participation of any new movement or party, different to the traditional
Conservative and Liberal Party. However, according to Roland and Zapata (2005), the most impor-
tant change introduced was establishing the election to the Senate at a national level, allowing the
candidates to present a national candidacy in order to find a broader electorate.
Effectively, the number of parties running in the Senate election increased along with the number
of parties elected but another consequence of lowering entry barriers was an increase in the number
of list running. Figure 1 shows, for every Senate election held from 1991 onwards, in panel A, the
number of parties elected while in panel B, the number of lists running. As we can see, both the
number of parties elected and the number of lists running are increasing over the years up to 2002,
the last election before the political reform was implemented. The political reform helped not only
diminish the number of parties elected but also the number of list running, as it restrict the number
of lists and candidates each party could present to the elections.
According to Ca´rdenas, Junguito, and Pacho´n (2006), the Hare quota and largest remainders sys-
tem generates incentives for parties to fragment into factions, especially for the ones that are large
enough to get at least one seat allocated by quota.1 Then, as to maximize their chances to increase
their number of seats, the traditional parties were dividing their list, having lists by factions, increasing
the total number of list running under their party label.
But, the proliferation of parties led to a Senate full of small parties in which cooperation was harder
to achieve declining governability. To strength the parties (Botero and Rodr´ıguez-Raga, 2009) and
to stop the proliferation of small parties (Battle and Puyana, 2013), among others reasons, in July
1Because of the Hare quota and largest remainders, the seats are first allocated to the lists that surpass the quota
and the remaining seats are allocated to the lists with largest remainders. Cox and Shugart (1995) show how a party
can obtain additional seats by running multiple lists.
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2003, the Colombian Congress approved the acto legislativo 01 de 2003 which modified the rules of the
electoral process. The changes introduced by the reform that matter to this work are:2
• It established a minimum share of votes (threshold) in the election in order for a party or
movement to be recognized.
• It established that only the candidates of a recognized party or movement can get a seat.
• It prohibited any candidate or citizen to be member of more than one party.
• It adopted a unique list of candidates for each party and the preferential vote.
• It changed the assignment mechanism, passing from Hare quota to D’Hondt method.3
3 Methodology
3.1 Quasi-experiment
Using the 2006 Senate election results, I simulate the election but instead of using D’Hondt method
as the assignment mechanism, I use Hare quota and largest remainders mechanism. Also, I use all
the candidates who run in the 2006 Senate election, included the ones from parties that were not
recognized, as they did not surpass the threshold requirement, but could have got a seat under the
previous assignment mechanism. The results of the simulation are summarized in table 1.
There are 4 groups of 2006 Senate election candidates. The first two groups are candidates who
actually got a seat in 2006 election using D’Hondt method and candidates who did not get a seat in
2006 election using D’Hondt method. Each of these groups is made up of the candidates that would
have been elected using Hare quota as assignment mechanism and the candidates that would have not
been elected using Hare quota.
As I am going to compare the legislative behavior of the senators during the 4-year term, only
the candidates who actually got a seat in 2006 are of interest, no matter if in the simulation they
would have been elected or not. Then, I keep 98 senators4 and rule out the rest of candidates. Then,
according to table 1 there are 22 senators that would have not been elected had the reform not been
made, while there are 76 senators that would have been elected anyways.
3.2 Regression Discontinuity
I can define a treatment indicator variable W for treatment and control group using the results of
the simulation. Recall that the individuals who belong to the treatment groups are the senators that
got a seat in 2006 but would have not using Hare quota as assignment mechanism, or the senators
benefiting from the reform. The control group, in contrast, is the senators who would have been elected
anyways. Then, the indicator variable is:
Wi =
{
1 if benefited from the reform,
0 if not benefited from the reform.
2For a more detailed explanation of the reform, I suggest see Battle and Puyana (2013), Dura´n (2006) or Rodr´ıguez-
Raga and Botero (2006).
3I briefly expose both assignment mechanisms in the appendix. For further details and examples, I suggest see Ro´bles
(2005).
4Even though there are 102 senators, I ruled out the 2 senators elected from a closed list, as I cannot input votes
at the individual level, and the senators elected from special circumscriptions, as they do not run against all the other
candidates.
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Because there is no minimum share of votes, or number of votes, needed to get a seat, I define a
threshold k as the share of votes at the national level the last candidate that would have been elected
using Hare quota obtained. The share of votes each senator got is the amount of votes divided by the
total valid votes at the national level. Then, for each senator i, let k be the threshold such that:
k = min{sharei|seatHQi = 1} (1)
where sharei is the share of votes each candidate i obtained in 2006 election, and seat
HQ
i is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the senator i would have got a seat using Hare quota as assignment
mechanism but the votes he obtained in 2006.
After that, I define the running variable as the relative distance between the threshold k and the
share of votes each senator i obtained (sharei). Then, for each senator i, let Z be the running variable
such that Zi = sharei− k. Note that, by construction, there is a senator j whose share of votes is the
same as the threshold, therefore Zj = 0.
Then, the share of votes of all the senators is normalized, where positive values of Z means been
elected anyways; negative, been elected in 2006 but would have not using Hare quota and Z = 0 is
the threshold redefined as Z¯ = Z = 0. Because of this normalization, I can redefine the treatment
indicator W as a function of the running variable Z:5
Wi =
{
1 if Zi < 0
0 if Zi ≥ 0
Next, I define the outcome variable Y . I use three measures as proxy for legislative behavior: the
first one is the number of law drafts presented by each senator. The variable count how many law
drafts presented each senator as author during the 4-year term. The second variable is a discipline
index elaborated by Congreso Visible called the Partisan Agreement Index; it takes values between 0
and 1, where 1 means that the senator has been fully disciplined; and zero, the opposite.6 The third
outcome variable is the number of times a senator attends to a voting session. Table 2 summarize the
main variables used by treatment and control group. Panel A shows the share of votes of each senator
as well as the normalized share of votes; while panel B, the three outcome variables.
I use a sharp regression discontinuity design to test differences in the outcomes of the senators
using both a non-parametric approach and a parametric approach. For the non-parametric approach,
I follow Angrist and Pischke (2009), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Lee and Lemieux (2010) model
of a local polynomial regression, given by:
Yi = α+ θWi + δf(zi) + i (2)
where Yi is the outcome variable for senator i, Wi is the treatment indicator variable for senator i,
and f(·) is the pth-order polynomial in the share of votes zi. The variable zi is the share of votes each
senator i obtained but defined for values of z such that z = |Z − Z¯| < h, where Z¯ is the minimum
normalized share of votes that a senator would have need to get a seat in the simulation. This speci-
fication allows me to calculate the Local Treatment Effect. Robust standard errors are used.
Lee and Lemiuex highlight the importance of the non-parametric results since, as they said, “there
is no particular reason to believe that the true model is linear,” and “the consequences of using an
incorrect functional form are more serious in the case of RD designs however, since misspecification
5As Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest, the key difference between and RDD and others regressions is that the
treatment variable W is not only correlated with Z, but it is a deterministic function of the latter because once we know
Zi we know Wi. No matter how close Zi gets to Z¯, treatment is unchanged until Zi = Z¯
6For further details, see Quiroga, Jacobo, and Camacho (2013).
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of the functional form typically generates a bias in the treatment effect.” (Lee and Lemiuex, 2010, p316)
To show the non-parametric result I use the Wald estimator, and as a robustness check, I estimate
it for half, twice, and 1.5 times the bandwidth. Recall that, if Y represents the outcome, Z is the
running variable, W is the treatment indicator variable and the cut-off point (Z = 0) is represented
by Z¯, then the Wald estimator is defined as:
θWald = lim
∆→0
E[Yi|Wi = 0, Z¯ < Zi < Z¯ + ∆]− E[Yi|Wi = 1, Z¯ −∆ < Zi < Z¯]
= lim
∆→0
E[Yi(0)|Z¯ < Zi < Z¯ + ∆]− E[Yi(1)|Z¯ −∆ < Zi < Z¯]
= E[Yi(0)− Yi(1)|Zi = Z¯] (3)
Then, the Wald estimator is the difference in the expected value of the outcome of the control group
minus the outcome of the treatment group, for observations near the cut-off point. Since a positive
effect for the treatment group over the control group gives a negative value to the Wald estimator, I
multiply it by -1 in order to capture the positive effect with a positive coefficient. Therefore, equation
3 is modified as follows:
θWald = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Zi = Z¯] (4)
In order to use a regression discontinuity design, I need two conditions (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
First, the treatment must be randomly assigned conditional on observables (unconfoundedness assump-
tion) and the individuals cannot manipulate the assignment variable. Second, as I cannot observe the
same individual with or without treatment, then to observe the treatment effect, two individuals
around the cut-off point that are arbitrarily close to each other are compared. Since I am simulating
the elections with given results, no candidate can neither manipulate the amount of votes obtained in
the election nor change from treatment to control group.
To satisfy the second condition, I compare senators whose share of votes are within a bandwidth h
around the cut-off point. In this case, the cut-off point is the minimum share of votes that a senator
would have need to get a seat in the simulation (threshold Z¯). In doing so, I compare senators that
would have been barely elected in the simulation with senators that would have lost, but were near to
be elected, as they obtained almost the same share of votes. Table 3 shows a set of control variables.
Panel A presents some personal characteristics of senators by treatment group; while panel B, some
political characteristics. The last column of the table shows the t-test of mean differences.
Table 3 shows that there are few characteristics whose difference in means is significant. Senators
from the treatment group were born in different Departments than senators from the control group,
particularly, there are more that were born in Casanare, in Putumayo, and in San Andre´s. In addition,
there are more senators in the treatment group that belong to political party ALAS, while there are
more senators in the control group that belong to the Conservative party. Additionally, more senators
from the control group were part of the fourth commission in the Senate. Finally, more senators from
the treatment group change to a coalition party in 2009. Since only 7 out of 56 characteristics are sig-
nificant, I am comparing senators who belong to treatment and control groups that are similar to each
other, satisfying the second condition. Nonetheless, I control the regressions for these characteristics.
Finally, since the optimal bandwidth h following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) is calculated
as:
h∗ = argminhMSE(h)
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where MSE is the mean squared error then, each one of the three outcome variables has a different
optimal bandwidth, because there is not information for all the observations on each outcome.7 I
decide to use two different values (h = 0.15 and h = 0.20) which satisfy the assumption of comparing
individuals really near the threshold and are close to the optimal bandwidth values calculated for each
of the three outcomes. Since the running variable is the (normalized) share of votes, I am comparing
at most two senators whose difference in the share of votes is not larger than 0.4 percentage points.
This distance allows us to be close to the threshold and, at the same time, to have a fair number of
congressmen in the treatment group.
3.3 Data
I use two main databases. On the one hand, there is the electoral data that comes from the Center
of Economic Development Studies (cede) from Universidad de los Andes and from the Registradur´ıa
Nacional (the Colombian Electoral Agency). This dataset is at the candidate level by municipality
and contains the corporation the candidate is running for, its party and the votes it obtained, among
other information. Pacho´n y Sa´nchez (2014) makes a more detailed explanation of the database.
On the other hand, there is the congressmen dataset that comes from Congreso Visible, from
Universidad de los Andes’s Department of Political Science.8 This data contains information at the
candidate level about their congressional activity such as their political career, the amount of law
drafts presented by each of them during each term, an index of political discipline and the number of
voting sessions they attend to during each term, as well as some personal information such as their
age, place of birth, schooling level, and their professional trajectory.
The index of political discipline is a partisan agreement index developed by Congreso Visible which
is elaborated based on the debate’s roll-call votes. To compute the index they take the number of
times a senator votes like the majority of his party, or as the party indicates, and divide it by the
number of times the senator votes. The result is and index ranging between zero and one, where one
means that the senator has been fully disciplined; and zero, the opposite.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
On the one hand, there are the results of the non-parametric estimations. Table 4 shows the Wald
estimator for the three outcomes (each one in one column) for a bandwidth of h = 0.20 (lwal) and
the 75 percent (h = 0.15), the 125 percent (h = 0.25), and the 150 percent (h = 0.30) of that value.
Column one (1) presents the results for the number of law draft presented during the 4-year term;
column two (2), for the discipline index; while column three (3) for the attendance to voting sessions.
For the number of law draft presented, there is a positive effect although it is not significant, while for
the discipline index and the attendance to voting sessions there is also a positive and significant effect.
On the other hand, table 5 shows the parametric results. Panel A shows the results for law drafts;
panel B, for the discipline index; while panel C, for the attendance outcome. Columns one (1) to three
(3) show the result using all the observations and polynomial regressions of first, second, and third
order, respectively. Columns four (4) to six (6) show the results using as bandwidth h = 0.15 and
polynomial regressions of first, second, and third order; while the last three columns use as bandwidth
7Following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) methodology, the optimal bandwidths for law drafts, the discipline
index, and the attendance variables respectively are 0.11, 0.13, and 0.17.
8Thanks to Laura Wills, director of Congreso Visible, for her help with this dataset.
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h = 0.20 and polynomial regressions of first, second, and third order, repectively. The last row of the ta-
ble reports the value of the bandwidth used. When no bandwidth is reported, all observations are used.
For the case of number of law drafts presented by the senators during the 4-year term (panel A),
there is a positive effect of the treatment in both parametric and non-parametric results, although it
is not significant. This means that the senators that would have lost, but were near to be elected in
the simulation, present more law drafts during the 4-year term when compared with the senators that
would have been barely elected in the simulation (but not significant).
For the discipline index (panel B), there is also a positive effect of the treatment in both parametric
and non-parametric results. Even though not all the specification are significant, the magnitude of the
coefficients is robust around 0.120 percentage points, which means that the senators that would have
lost, but were near to be elected in the simulation, are on average 20 percent more disciplined with
respect to the senators that would have been barely elected in the simulation.
Finally, for the attendance to voting sessions (panel C), there is a positive effect of the treatment
in both parametric and non-parametric results; However, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger
in the parametric results. Also, not all the specifications are significant but there is no change in
the direction of the effect and the coefficients are not robust around a particular value. In the lowest
estimation, the senator that would have lost, but were near to be elected in the simulation, attend on
average to 40 percent more voting sessions that the senators that would have been barely elected.
However, there were differences in the attendance to voting session among the two groups of
senators, as shown in table 2. There is a significant difference between the senators that would have
lost, but were near to be elected in the simulation, with respect to the one that would have been barely
elected. On average, the senators that would have lost attend to 185 more voting sessions. Taking
into account this difference, the magnitude of the effect is reduced but it is still positive. The lowest
estimation of the effect is to attend on average to 4 percent more voting sessions, with respect to the
senators that would have been barely elected.
4.2 Further results
These results suggests that, the senators that would have lost, but were near to be elected when
simulating the 2006 Senate elections using Hare quota as the assignment mechanism, present more law
drafts (although not significant), are about 20% more disciplined, and attend to at least to 4% more
voting sessions with respect to the senators that would have been barely elected. Yet, these results
cannot be interpreted as being a better senator or a better politician.
A possible explanation for the difference in the legislative behavior of the senators could be that the
senators are seeking an electoral return in the subsequent election. As mentioned, the senators that
belong to the treatment group are the ones who obtained fewer share of votes then, they may display
this behavior in order to increase their share of votes in the subsequent election or their probability of
being (re)elected.
Using the same methodology as before, I explore the effect on the probability of being elected in
2010 (table 7) and the effect on their share of votes in 2010 (table 8). The probability of being elected
in 2010 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the senator is elected again in 2010 and zero
if the senator is not elected in 2010. The share of votes is calculated dividing the votes the senator-
candidate obtain in 2010 Senate election by the total number of valid votes in the 2010 Senate election.
Hereafter, I use only the senators that run for 2010 Senate election, i.e. the ones who are seeking
reelection. Table 6 summarizes, for the two groups of senators, how many run in 2010 Senate elec-
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tion. There are 49 senators (out of 98) that decide to run in 2010 Senate election, 31 belong to the
control group (the ones would have been elected in the simulation using 2006 results) while 18 be-
long to the treatment group (the ones would not have been elected in the simulation using 2006 results).
Since I am using only 49 observations, imposing a bandwidth will decrease the sample size; there-
fore, I use all the 49 observations in the RDD with polynomial of first, second, and third order. To
control for possible differences, as I am not comparing the senators just around the threshold, I in-
clude personal characteristics, such as age, gender, place of birth, and education. I also control for
political characteristics, such as experience in the Senate or in Congress, the party they belong to, the
commission the senator belong to in 2006 term, and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
senator did not finished the 4-years, term.9 Then, tables 7 and 8 show in the first three columns a
polynomial regression of first order. The first column include all the observations and no controls, the
second column include personal controls, while the third column controls for political characteristics.
The next three columns (4 to 6) do the same but for a polynomial of second order, while the last three
columns (7 to 9) uses a polynomial of third order.
As it can be seen in table 7, there is no differential probability of being elected in 2010. The coeffi-
cient is not robust nor the direction of the effect. Using a first order polynomial, the effect is significant
at 10%, but the significance, magnitude, and direction of the effect is changed when included personal
and political characteristics. The estimations using a second order polynomial show a negative effect,
but not significant; while, the estimations using a third order polynomial show a positive but not
significant effect when personal or no characteristics are used, however, when I control for political
characteristics, the coefficient shows a negative effect, but again not significant.
On the other hand, table 8 shows the effect on the share of votes in 2010 Senate election. As in the
previous case, there are non-robust results and they suggest that there is not a differential change in
the share of votes of the two groups. None of the first order polynomial estimations is significant but
the direction of the effect change from being positive (when personal or no characteristics controls are
used) to being negative when controlling for political and personal characteristics. The estimations of
the second order polynomial show a negative and significant effect on the share of votes, although the
significance is lost when controlling for personal and political characteristics. Finally, the estimations
for the third order polynomial show a negative and significant (at 10%) coefficient, but the direction
and magnitude of the effect is changed when controlling for personal characteristics (the significance
of the effect remains at 10%). When controlling for political characteristics the direction, magnitude,
and significance of the effect changes again, showing a non-robust effect.
Since these results are comparing the share of votes of all the candidates, not having into account
the party they belong to, then table 9 explore the possibility of senators improving their share of votes
within their party list. As the last candidate elected from a party list (who belong to the treatment
group) can be the 10th candidate elected from a big party, while being the 5th if elected from a small
party. For that, I calculate the share of votes each candidate got dividing the number of votes by the
total votes the party get.
Table 9 shows the results of this possibility. As in the previous cases, the results suggests that
there is not a differential change in the share of votes within the party list. The first order polynomial
estimations show a positive but not significant effect, when no controls are used and when controlling
for personal characteristics, however when controlling for political characteristics, the direction of the
effect change to being negative. None of the coefficients of the estimations using a second order poly-
nomial is significant, and the direction of the effect changes from negative to positive when personal
characteristics are included, and again changes to negative when controlling for political characteris-
9Table 3 show the descriptive statistics.
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tics. The estimations using a third order polynomial present a negative and significant effect (at 1%),
however when controlling for personal characteristics the significance is lost and the magnitude and
direction change. The direction of the effect changes again to negative (non-significant) when political
characteristics are included showing a non-robust effect.
Another possible explanation is that, while the share of votes seems not to have a difference, the
concentration of votes could differ from one group to another.10 A candidate could decide to focus
his campaign in only one region, while other candidate could decide to do his campaign nationwide.
Rodr´ıguez-Raga (2001) shows for 1991, 1994 and 1998 Senate election that the candidates has no
preference over concentrate their votes or not, even though he found that the candidates whose votes
are more concentrated are slightly more successful in terms of getting a seat.
In order to measure the concentration of votes, I calculate the inverse of the Herfindahl index at
the departmental level for each senator-candidate using the results of 2010 Senate election.11 This
concentration index ranges from one to thirty three, where 1 means their votes are highly concentrated
or that the candidate obtained all of their votes in one Department and 33 means their votes are
equally distributed between the 33 Departments.
Table 10 show the results when using the same methodology as before. They suggest that there is
no difference in the concentration of votes between the two groups of candidates. Neither the magni-
tude nor the direction of the effect is robust to the specifications. The estimates show, for the first,
second, and third order polynomial, a negative effect on the concentration index, when using no con-
trols or when controlling for personal characteristics, but none of them being significant. For the first,
second and third order polynomial estimations show a positive effect, although not significant, when
controlling for personal and political characteristics.
Finally, the relation between various politicians and paramilitary groups marked the 2006 Senate
term (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, 2013) and the reelection rate for the subsequent election. A
consequence of this relation was that 35 percent of the senators elected in 2006 resigned their seat
before the term 4-year term finished. According to Duque (2011), only 44 out of 102 senators were
reelected in 2010 (43%). This reelection rate is lower than the reelection rate of previous Senate elec-
tions, were more than 50 percent of the senators were reelected. Moreover, according to Ca´rdenas,
Junguito, and Pacho´n (2006) the reelection rate in the Senate have had a positive trend in Colombia
since 1935, reaching a peak in 1986, when the reelection rate was more than 60%.12
Since the proportion of senators seeking reelection diminished with respect to previous elections,
our results can be biased, as they are not taking into account all of the senators that would have
run for reelection. Then, I check for differences in the probability of being investigated for links with
paramilitary groups only for the senators who seek reelection in 2010. The probability of being inves-
tigated uses a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the senator was investigated for links with
paramilitary groups during the term, and zero otherwise. Table 11 shows the results of the probability
of being investigated of the senators that would have lost in the simulation, with respect to the senators
10Rodr´ıguez-Raga (2001) point out the concentration of votes as one of the two dimensions of the electoral strategies.
11The inverse of the Herfindahl Index can be expressed as:
CIi =
1∑33
d=1 s
2
d,i
where CIi is the concentration index for candidate i and sd,i is the share of votes candidate i obtained in the Department
d. There are 33 Departments: one for each of the 32 Departments of Colombia and 1 for Bogota´, the capital city.
12Ca´rdenas, Junguito, and Pacho´n present data from 1935 to 1998. The reelection rate increase steadily from around
10% in 1935 to more than 60% in 1986. Then, after 1991 Constitution the reelection rates decreased but were higher
than 40% and increased over 50% for 1998 Senate election.
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that would have been elected anyways.
As it can be seen in table 11, the results suggests that there is no differential probability of being
investigated, then the senators that would have lost in the simulation are not more likely of being
investigated when compared to the senators that would have been elected anyways. The estimates show
a negative effect although not significant for the first order, second and third order polynomial. The
negative effect is robust when personal characteristics are included, and when political characteristics
are included as well. Then, any group of senators is more likely of being investigated, thus I have not
a selection bias on the sample I am using.
5 Final comments
It is not easy to measure the legislative behavior of senators; however, the political reform of 2003
creates a unique scenario as it modified the assignment mechanism while keeping the number of public
offices to be provided. I take advantage of this change in the rule simulating the 2006 Senate election
using the actual voting but instead of using D’Hondt formula as the assignment mechanism, I use the
mechanism used before the reform took place, namely the Hare coefficient and largest remainders.
I use a Regression Discontinuity Design to compare the legislative behavior of the senators that
would have lost in the simulation versus the senators that would have been elected anyways. I use as
proxy three different measures: the amount of law drafts presented during the 4-year term, a discipline
index, and the attendance to voting sessions. I find that the senators that would have lost in the
simulation present more law drafts, although it is not significant the effect, are 20% more disciplined,
and attend to at least 4% more voting sessions.
Since this behavior cannot be described as being better politician or as having better behavior,
I explore the possibility of differences in the electoral returns of these two groups of senators in the
subsequent election. I find that there are no differences in the probability of being (re)elected in 2010,
in the share of votes, in the share of votes within their party list, and in the concentration of votes.
Also, since 2006 term was marked for links between senators and paramilitary groups, and 35% of the
senators did not finish the 4-year term, I explore the possibility of differential probabilities of being
investigated. Yet I find that neither group of senators is more likely to be investigated.
However, for instance, Plata (2011) found a positive and significant effect of the law drafts pre-
sented and approved over the reelection, although he uses data from the House of Representatives.
Hoskin et al. (2011) and Ca´rdenas, Junguito, and Pacho´n (2006), on the other hand, argue that the
most important law drafts are presented by the executive, making the Congress loses its importance
in terms of law drafts presented.
In terms of reelection, Redmon and Regan (2015) use a regression discontinuity design to show the
effect of the incumbency in the probability that a candidate in Ireland’s lower house of parliament wins
a seat in the next election. Ireland’s electoral system is a proportional representation with a single
transferable vote and, also, multiple incumbents could run for reelection. They found an increase in
the probability of 18 percentage points.
Although, there are studies that suggest that the probability of reelection is due to other reasons
different to the legislative behavior or incumbency. For instance, Carey and Shugart (1995) suggest
that the Colombian electoral system can be consider as a personal-list system; therefore, a candidate
is elected independently of his legislative behavior or whether he is incumbent or not. Hoskin et al.
(2011) provide an explanation to this idea; they found that parties are decentralized and the con-
gressional representatives are region oriented, as they serve as the link between their region and the
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institutions in Bogota´.
Nonetheless, the political reform of 2003 played an important role in the electoral system. For
example, one of the objectives of the political reform was to diminish the amount of parties in power
in order to improve governability and to strength the political parties (Battle and Puyana, 2013).
Giraldo and Lo´pez (2006) presents some positive effects of the reform on the electoral and political
party system, such as strengthen the parties in power.
I cannot compare the effects showed by Giraldo and Lo´pez as they are taking parties as the unit
of analysis while I am taking candidates. It is out of the scope of this work to look at the effects at
the party level, although it will complement the present work to look the results at the party level as
the results at the individual level seems not to be capturing the difference in legislative behavior.
6 References
Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos (2013) The Monopoly of Violence:
Evidence from Colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Asso-
ciation, vol. 11(s1): 5-44, January.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke (2009) Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiri-
cist’s Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Batlle, Margarita, and Jose´ Ricardo Puyana (2013) Reformas pol´ıticas y partidos en Colombia:
cuando el cambio es la regla. Politai: Revista de Ciencia Pol´ıtica, vol. 7: 73-88, November.
Ca´rdenas, Mauricio, Roberto Junguito, and Mo´nica Pacho´n (2006) Political Institutions and Pol-
icy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution. Inter-American Development Bank,
Research Network Working Paper #R-508, February.
Carey, John M., and Matthew S. Shugart (1995) Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank
Ordering of Electoral Formulas. Electoral Studies: Elsevier, vol. 14(4): 417-439, December.
Congreso Visible (2010) Balance del cuatrienio 2006-2010. Programa Congreso Visible, bolet´ın 17,
Universidad de los Andes, agosto. Disponible en l´ınea
http://www.congresovisible.org/media/uploads/boletines/Bolet%C3%ADn agosto baja.pdf
Cox, Gary W., and Matthew S. Shugart (1995) In the Absence of Vote Pooling: Nomination and
vote allocation errors in Colombia. Electoral Studies, Elsevier, vol. 14(4): 441-460, December.
Duque, Javier (2011) El Congreso de la Repu´blica en Colombia: Estabilidad y renovacio´n en las
elecciones de 2010. Colombia Internacional, vol. 74: 119-151, julio-diciembre.
Dura´n, Mar´ıa Camila (2006) La reforma pol´ıtica de 2003: ¿Ma´s de lo mismo? Papel Pol´ıtico Es-
tudiantil, Bogota´ (Colombia), vol. 2(1): 113-135, enero-junio.
Giraldo, Fernando, and Jose´ Daniel Lo´pez (2006) El comportamiento electoral y de partidos en
los comicios para Ca´mara de Representantes de 2002 y 2006: un estudio comparado desde la Reforma
Pol´ıtica. Colombia Internacional, vol. 64: 122-153, julio-diciembre.
Hoskin, Gary, Francisco Leal, Harvey Kline, Dora Ro¨thlisberger, and Armando Borrero (2011) Un
estudio del Congreso colombiano. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Pol´ıtica,
12
Centro de Estudios Socioculturales e Internacionales (cedo), Universidad de los Andes, Ediciones
Uniandes, Bogota´, octubre.
Imbens, Guido W., and Karthik Kalyanaraman (2012) Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Re-
gression Discontinuity Estimator. Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(3):
933-959.
Imbens, Guido W., and Thomas Lemieux (2008) Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to prac-
tice. Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2): 615-635, February.
Lee, David, and Thomas Lemieux (2010) Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics. Journal
of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2): 281-355, June.
Pacho´n, Mo´nica, and Fabio Sa´nchez (2014) Base de datos sobre resultados electorales cede, 1958
–2011. Universidad de los Andes, Serie Documentos cede 2014-29, agosto.
Pacho´n, Mo´nica, and Matthew S. Shugart (2010) Electoral reform and the mirror image of inter-
party and intra-party competition: The adoption of party lists in Colombia. Electoral Studies, Elsevier,
vol. 29(4): 648-660, December.
Plata, Juan Camilo (2011) Buscar la reeleccio´n en 2010: el efecto de la efectividad legislativa.
Colombia Internacional, vol. 74: 153-172, julio-diciembre.
Quiroga, Daniel, Felipe Jacobo, and Paola Camacho (2013) ¿Co´mo juzgamos a nuestros congresis-
tas? On-line article from www.congresovisible.org, available at
http://congresovisible.org/agora/post/como-juzgamos-a-nuestros-congresistas/5051/
Redmond, Paul, and John Regan (2015) Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system:
A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections. European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 38:
244-256, June.
Ro´bles, Francisco (1995) Formulas electorales, proporcionalidad y bipartidismo modificado: los ca-
sos de Colombia y Venezuela. Papel Pol´ıtico No 2, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogota´, Colombia,
pp. 45-62, octubre.
Rodr´ıguez-Raga, Juan Carlos (2001) ¿Cambiar todo para que nada cambie? Representacio´n, sis-
tema electoral y sistema de partido en Colombia: capacidad de adaptacio´n de las e´lites pol´ıticas a
cambios en el entorno institucional. En Francisco Gutie´rrez (compilador), Degradacio´n o cambio:
Evolucio´n del sistema pol´ıtico colombiano, Bogota´: Grupo editorial Norma, pp. 79-130, junio.
Rodr´ıguez-Raga, Juan Carlos, and Felipe Botero (2006) Ordenando el caos: Elecciones legislativas
y reforma electoral en Colombia. Revista de Ciencia Pol´ıtica (Santiago), Santiago, Chile, vol. 26(1):
138-151.
Roland, Ge´rard, and Juan Gonzalo Zapata (2005) Colombia’s Electoral and Party System: Pos-
sible Paths for Reform. In Alberto Alesina (editor), Institutional Reforms: The Case of Colombia,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 103-130, January.
13
Table 1: Candidates running in 2006 Senate election
Simulation 2006
not elected elected Total
Election 2006
not elected 697 24 721
elected 22 76 98
Total 719 100 819
Table 2: Main variables
Control Treatment ttest
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev diff
Panel A: Running variable
Share of votes 76 0.633 0.2931 22 0.327 0.0364 0.3060***
Normalized share of votes 76 0.227 0.2931 22 -0.078 0.0364 0.3060***
Panel B: Outcome variables
Law drafts presented 75 16.387 12.838 22 19.5 8.8304 -3.1133
Discipline index 72 0.6164 0.1265 20 0.627 0.1104 -0.0112
Attendance to voting sessions 72 281.5 257.37 20 466.9 203.99 -185.37***
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Table 3: Control variables
Control Treatment ttest
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. diff
Panel A: Personal characteristics
Years of schooling 73 16,73 1,3669 21 17,05 0,8047 -0,3216
Female 75 0,1200 0,3271 22 0,0909 0,2942 0,0291
Age 70 50,16 9,1946 20 53,10 8,7654 -2,9429
Birth Department
Born abroad 75 0,0133 0,1155 22 0 0 0,0133
Antioquia 75 0,1200 0,3271 22 0,0909 0,2942 0,0291
Atlantico 75 0,1067 0,3108 22 0,0909 0,2942 0,0158
Bogota´ 75 0,0933 0,2929 22 0,1364 0,3513 -0,0430
Cundinamarca 75 0,0133 0,1155 22 0 0 0,0133
Santander 75 0,0933 0,2929 22 0,0455 0,2132 0,0479
Bolivar 75 0,0400 0,1973 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0055
Boyaca´ 75 0,0400 0,1973 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0055
Tolima 75 0,0400 0,1973 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0055
Caldas 75 0,0400 0,1973 22 0 0 0,0400
Co´rdoba 75 0,0800 0,2731 22 0 0 0,0800
Magdalena 75 0,0133 0,1155 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0321
Narin˜o 75 0,0267 0,1622 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0188
Norte de Santander 75 0,0533 0,2262 22 0 0 0,0533
Cauca 75 0,0400 0,1973 22 0,0909 0,2942 -0,0509
Huila 75 0,0267 0,1622 22 0 0 0,0267
Risaralda 75 0,0267 0,1622 22 0 0 0,0267
Meta 75 0,0133 0,1155 22 0 0 0,0133
Quind´ıo 75 0,0133 0,1155 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0321
Sucre 75 0,0400 0,1973 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0055
Valle del Cauca 75 0,0533 0,2262 22 0,0455 0,2132 0,0079
Casanare 75 0 0 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0455*
La Guajira 75 0,0133 0,1155 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0321
Putumayo 75 0 0 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0455*
San Andre´s 75 0 0 22 0,0455 0,2132 -0,0455*
Panel B: Political characteristics
Political experience
Senate candidate in 2002 76 0,6842 0,4679 22 0,5455 0,5096 0,1388
Representative in 2002 76 0,2500 0,4359 22 0,2727 0,4558 -0,0227
Senator in 2002 76 0,5395 0,5018 22 0,3636 0,4924 0,1758
Representative in 1998 76 0,2632 0,4433 22 0,2273 0,4289 0,0359
Senator in 1998 76 0,3158 0,4679 22 0,3182 0,4767 -0,0024
Experience in Senate 76 0,5658 0,4989 22 0,4545 0,5096 0,1112
Experience in House of Representatives 76 0,8158 0,3902 22 0,7273 0,4558 0,0885
Terms in Congress since 1998 75 2,3467 0,7968 22 2,0909 0,8679 0,2558
Political party
Conservative 75 0,2267 0,4215 22 0 0 0,2267**
Liberal 75 0,2000 0,4027 22 0,1364 0,3513 0,0636
Partido de la U 75 0,1867 0,3923 22 0,2727 0,4558 -0,0861
Cambio Radical 75 0,1333 0,3422 22 0,2273 0,4289 -0,0939
Polo 75 0,0933 0,2929 22 0,1364 0,3513 -0,0430
Convergencia ciudadana 75 0,0667 0,2511 22 0,0909 0,2942 -0,0242
ALAS 75 0,0133 0,1155 22 0,1364 0,3513 -0,1230**
Colombia Democrat´ica 75 0,0400 0,1973 22 0 0 0,0400
Colombia Viva 75 0,0267 0,1622 22 0 0 0,0267
Characteristics during 2006 term
Not finished the 4-years term 76 0,4211 0,4970 22 0,0909 0,2942 0,3301
President of Commission 76 0,0526 0,2248 22 0 0 0,0526
Change party in 2009 76 0,0395 0,1960 22 0,0909 0,2942 -0,0514
Change to coalition party in 2009 76 0,0132 0,1147 22 0,0909 0,2942 -0,0778*
First Committee in 2006 75 0,2133 0,4124 22 0,1818 0,3948 0,0315
Sencond Committee in 2006 75 0,1200 0,3271 22 0,0909 0,2942 0,0291
Third Committee in 2006 75 0,1333 0,3422 22 0,2273 0,4289 -0,0939
Fourth Committee in 2006 75 0,1200 0,3271 22 0,1818 0,3948 -0,0618
Fifthe Committee in 2006 75 0,1467 0,3562 22 0 0 0,1467*
Sixth Committee in 2006 75 0,1200 0,3271 22 0,1818 0,3948 -0,0618
Seventh Committee in 2006 75 0,1467 0,3562 22 0,1364 0,3513 0,0103
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Table 4: Non-parametric results
Law Attendance
Drafts Discipline Voting
Presented Index Sessions
(1) (2) (3)
lwald 2.405 0.120* 199.7*
(5.251) (0.0693) (107.5)
lwald75 2.774 0.118 188.1
(5.889) (0.0803) (115.0)
lwald125 3.364 0.123* 203.3*
(5.114) (0.0641) (104.7)
lwald150 4.302 0.123** 205.2**
(4.972) (0.0590) (101.0)
Observations 97 92 92
Optimal Bandwidth 0.200 0.200 0.200
The first row show the results of the Wald estimator using
h = 0.20 as bandwidth. The second row show the results
for h = 0.15; the third row, for h = 0.25; and the fourth
row for h = 0.30. All regressions are controlled by variables
whose difference in means is significant. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Parametric results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1st order 2nd order 3rd order 1st order 2nd order 3nd order 1st order 2nd order 3nd order
Panel A: Law Drafts Presented
Benefiting from the reform 7.646* 12.47 2.754 2.009 4.546 -3.589 2.030 5.559 -3.457
(4.244) (7.908) (12.12) (5.096) (8.953) (13.41) (4.871) (8.648) (13.10)
Constant 15.63*** 15.36*** 17.77*** 21.27*** 23.28*** 24.11*** 21.25*** 22.27*** 23.98***
(1.555) (2.509) (2.715) (3.163) (4.673) (5.757) (2.808) (4.143) (5.238)
Observations 97 97 97 63 63 63 71 71 71
R-squared 0.021 0.023 0.048 0.112 0.125 0.132 0.156 0.162 0.173
Panel B: Discipline Index
Benefiting from the reform 0.103*** 0.103 -0.00859 0.115* 0.123 -0.0180 0.125** 0.115 -0.0264
(0.0359) (0.0788) (0.0841) (0.0648) (0.120) (0.136) (0.0583) (0.110) (0.129)
Constant 0.616*** 0.617*** 0.581*** 0.603*** 0.597*** 0.591*** 0.593*** 0.605*** 0.599***
(0.0198) (0.0300) (0.0394) (0.0573) (0.0939) (0.113) (0.0500) (0.0810) (0.104)
Observations 92 92 92 60 60 60 68 68 68
R-squared 0.025 0.025 0.079 0.041 0.042 0.056 0.039 0.041 0.055
Panel C: Attendance to Voting Sessions
Benefiting from the reform 277.7*** 214.8 363.6** 199.1* 162.3 426.8** 204.1* 164.4 353.7*
(85.85) (151.3) (179.5) (110.9) (177.3) (209.4) (106.0) (171.7) (200.9)
Constant 314.4*** 326.3*** 360.3*** 393.0*** 378.8*** 297.0** 388.0*** 376.7*** 370.2***
(35.51) (48.74) (60.87) (77.75) (100.7) (117.6) (70.87) (91.97) (104.3)
Observations 92 92 92 60 60 60 68 68 68
R-squared 0.122 0.124 0.136 0.124 0.125 0.148 0.116 0.118 0.123
Bandwidth 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.200 0.200 0.200
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Senators running in subsequent election
Simulation 2006
not elected elected Total
Election 2010
not elected 5 6 11
elected 13 25 38
Total 18 31 49
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Table 7: Probability of (re)election in 2010 Senate election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES 1st order 1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 3nd order 3nd order 3nd order
Benefiting from the reform 0.383* -0.0287 -0.0293 -0.366 -0.880 -0.0293 0.0671 1.722 -0.0293
(0.205) (0.437) (0) (0.293) (1.107) (0) (0.260) (1.367) (0)
Constant 0.853*** 3.874 5.170 1.047*** 4.563 5.170 1.130*** 6.502** 5.170
(0.0887) (2.417) (0) (0.0847) (2.621) (0) (0.0949) (2.822) (0)
Observations 49 44 44 49 44 44 49 44 44
R-squared 0.131 0.443 1.000 0.233 0.507 1.000 0.262 0.564 1.000
Personal controls X X X X X X
Political controls X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Share of votes in 2010 Senate election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES 1st order 1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 3nd order 3nd order 3nd order
Benefiting from the reform 0.108 0.0862 -0.332 -0.215** -0.141 -0.332 -0.216* 1.214* -0.332
(0.0801) (0.199) (0) (0.105) (0.478) (0) (0.123) (0.575) (0)
Constant 0.374*** 1.949 -2.290 0.530*** 2.629 -2.290 0.582*** 3.950** -2.290
(0.0627) (1.537) (0) (0.0706) (1.556) (0) (0.0937) (1.684) (0)
Observations 49 44 44 49 44 44 49 44 44
R-squared 0.442 0.698 1.000 0.543 0.759 1.000 0.551 0.797 1.000
Personal controls X X X X X X
Political controls X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Share of votes on the party list in 2010 Senate election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES 1st order 1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 3nd order 3nd order 3nd order
Benefiting from the reform 0.301 0.575 -2.149 -2.475 0.458 -2.149 -6.397*** 8.348 -2.149
(1.287) (2.047) (0) (1.710) (3.659) (0) (2.204) (4.782) (0)
Constant 2.886*** 20.25 -12.85 3.943*** 29.43* -12.85 6.153*** 34.25** -12.85
(0.924) (15.38) (0) (1.232) (15.03) (0) (1.733) (14.96) (0)
Observations 49 44 44 49 44 44 49 44 44
R-squared 0.094 0.854 1.000 0.134 0.918 1.000 0.244 0.927 1.000
Personal controls X X X X X X
Political controls X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Concentration index of the share of votes in 2010 Senate election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES 1st order 1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 3nd order 3nd order 3nd order
Benefiting from the reform -1.838 -5.084 0.0949 -3.397 -0.113 0.0949 -5.156 -1.050 0.0949
(1.655) (3.733) (0) (2.130) (3.728) (0) (3.140) (10.25) (0)
Constant 4.523*** 3.742 63.06 5.197*** 7.912 63.06 5.980*** 4.313 63.06
(0.957) (25.13) (0) (1.527) (21.77) (0) (2.134) (24.49) (0)
Observations 49 44 44 49 44 44 49 44 44
R-squared 0.052 0.685 1.000 0.071 0.709 1.000 0.090 0.717 1.000
Personal controls X X X X X X
Political controls X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES 1st order 1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 3nd order 3nd order 3nd order
Benefiting from the reform -0.0962 -0.0163 -0.643 -0.270 -0.124 -0.643 -0.186 -0.883 -0.643
(0.201) (0.478) (0) (0.205) (1.094) (0) (0.263) (2.119) (0)
Constant 0.244* 1.559 -8.189 0.349** 1.842 -8.189 -1.20e-05 3.238 -8.189
(0.133) (4.118) (0) (0.164) (4.369) (0) (0.174) (4.924) (0)
Observations 49 44 44 49 44 44 49 44 44
R-squared 0.069 0.393 1.000 0.089 0.398 1.000 0.262 0.611 1.000
Personal controls X X X X X X
Political controls X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Number of parties and lists in Senate elections
Figure 2: Scenario
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Figure 3: Scenario: Hare quota
Figure 4: Scenario: D’Hondt method
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A Appendix: Assignment mechanism
The change in the assignment mechanism introduced by the reform gives us a natural experiment
from which we can have different groups of candidates. Particularly, there are some candidates that
were elected in the congressional election after the reform, but would have not had the reform not
been made; there is another group of candidates that would have been elected anyways, and a last
group made up of the candidates who did not get a seat in the election after the reform, whether they
would have been elected or not using the previous mechanism. To best describe this situation, we set
up a scenario to explain both assignment mechanisms and to show which are the candidates that were
benefited from the reform.13
Suppose there are 2 political parties, X and Y, running in the congressional election. Each of these
parties have three lists labeled a, b, and c, where each list has a finite number of candidates, numbered
from 1 to n, and the order of the candidates matters. The candidate 1, from the list a, and party X
is noted Xa1. Also assume that there are 3 public offices to be assigned, i.e. three seats in the Congress.
In the assignment mechanism used previous to the reform, citizens vote for a list and the candidate
head of the list is the one who gets the seat if the list is assigned with one. In the case the list gets
more than one seat, the order of the candidates within the list matters to the assignment; therefore, a
second seat will go to the candidate placed second in the list. The lists and candidates are members
of a given party but the party itself plays no more roles.
In the assignment mechanism post reform each party is allowed to present at most as many can-
didates as public offices they are running for in one list. The order of the candidates within the
list do not matters as the citizens can vote either for the party or for a given candidate. If the
list is assigned with a seat, it goes to the candidate who gets more votes. In the case that more than
one seat is assigned to the list, they are assigned to the candidates who have more votes within the list.
Finally, assume that figure 2 present the results of the election held after the reform. The two
upper circles (labeled X and Y) represent the votes for the list of each party, while the six circles below
them represent the candidates within each list. In the top there is the total amount of votes each
party gets. Party X gets in total 50 votes: 11 votes were to the list, 20 to the candidate Xa1, 9 to Xb1
and 10 to Xc1. Correspondingly, party B gets 20 votes: 5 for the list, 1 for the candidate Ya1, Yb1
obtained 6 votes, while Yc1, 8 votes.
Hare Quota
Using this set up, we expose the assignment mechanism used previous to the reform. It uses the
Hare quota and the largest remainders method, and it is a party-list proportional representation sys-
tem. Since under this mechanism the parties do not play a role, then the votes assigned to the party
list are ruled out and we keep the results of each individual list. Figure 3 shows this case where the
two upper circles from the previous figure do not take place anymore.
The first step is to calculate the total votes of the election, by adding up the votes each list get.
After that, the hare coefficient is calculated dividing the total votes by the number of public offices to
be provided. In our scenario, the sum of the votes is 54 and the Hare coefficient or quota is 18, as the
number of seats to be assigned is 3. Then, all of the lists that surpass the quota are assigned with a
seat, making list Xa1 the only list satisfying this condition.
The second step is to divide the votes each list gets by the quota. The results are shown in figure
13We briefly expose here both assignment mechanisms. For further details and examples, we suggest see Ro´bles (2005).
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3 in parentheses below the votes the list obtained. Next, the remainders of the coefficients are sorted
from the highest to the lowest, including all lists. The seats left to be assigned are allocated to the
lists with the largest remainders. In our scenario, since there are two remaining seats, the seats go to
lists Xc1 and Xb1, making the three lists of party X the ones who get the seats.
D’Hondt Method
After the reform, the assignment mechanism uses the D’Hont method which is a highest averages
method for allocating seats in party-list proportional representation. Under this mechanism, as the
party has a unique list, the seats are allocated to parties in proportion of votes received. The list can
be a closed list or an open list: in the former, the party selects the order of election of their candidates,
as it matters, while in the latter the order is determined by the votes each candidate obtained.
The first step is calculate successive quotients dividing the total number of votes each party received
by successive natural numbers, beginning in 1 up to the total of public offices to be provided (3 in our
set up). The two upper circles in figure 4, labeled X and Y, show the total number of votes the each
party received divided by one; the next two, divided by two, labeled X’ and Y’; while the two circles
beneath, labeled X” and Y”, represent the total number of votes each party received divided by three.
Then, there are 6 lists as X’, X”, Y’, and Y” each represents a new list. The lists with the three
highest totals of votes are the ones who get the seats. In our scenario, the order is X > X ′ > Y >
X ′′ > Y ′ > Y ′′, therefore two seats go to party X while the other seat goes to party Y. Since in our set
up the lists are open list, the order is determined by the votes each candidate gets. For party X the
order is Xa1, Xc1, Xb1, then the seats go to candidates Xa1 and Xc1. The last seat goes to candidate
Yc1 from party Y, as the order is Yc1, Yb1, Ya1.
There are two main conclusions derived from the change in the assignment mechanism. First, un-
der D’Hondt method (after the reform), two parties were assigned with seats while under Hare quota
(before the reform) only one party gets all the seats. Second, candidate Yc1 is benefited from the re-
form, as it is elected under D’Hondt method system but would have not been elected under Hare quota.
As said before, when we simulate 2006 congressional elections using 2002 rule we can identify three
groups of candidates. The first group is made up by candidates who did not get a seat in 2006. The
second group is made up by candidates who were elected in 2006 but would have not using 2002
rule. Finally, the third group is made up by congressmen that would have been elected anyways,
independently of the mechanism used. Particularly, the last two groups are of interest.
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